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The effects of the three-point rule in first league German soccer are tested empirically and 
compared to games from the German cup-competition. The inclusion of cup games ensures 
that changes in league games can be attributed to the three-point rule. As a result of their rela-
tive devaluation, the number of draws should decrease. Furthermore, an increase in the num-
ber of close wins is expected. The strategy of a leading team becomes more defensive, result-
ing in fewer goal shootings by that team, as well as fewer shooting opportunities for the op-
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Sind drei Punkte für einen Sieg wirklich besser als zwei? 






Der Effekt der Einführung der Drei-Punkte-Regel in der 1. Fußball-Bundesliga wird empi-
risch getestet und anhand von Pokalspielergebnissen kontrolliert. Der Einbezug der Pokalspie-
le garantiert, dass vorhandene Änderungen in den Ligaspielen tatsächlich der Drei-Punkte-
Regel zugerechnet werden können. Als Ergebnis der Abwertung eines Unentschieden im 
Vergleich zu einem Sieg sollte die Anzahl der Unentschieden unter der Drei-Punkte-Regel 
sinken. Des Weiteren wird eine steigende Anzahl enger Spielausgänge erwartet. Führende 
Mannschaften werden unter der neuen Regel defensiver spielen, was zum einen zu weniger 
Torschüssen bei der führenden Mannschaft und zum anderen zu weniger Schussmöglichkei-
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Are Three Points for a Win Really Better Than Two? 
Theoretical and Empirical Evidence for German Soccer 
1. Introduction 
Before the 1995/96
1 season, the FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) 
raised the reward for a victory in football games from two to three points. The main objective 
of this rule change was to achieve more goals per game, fewer draws and above all, more ex-
citing and attractive matches. Since then, many theoretical and empirical studies have exam-
ined the effects of this incentive change and, to some extent, found significant changes in the 
results of soccer games since the rule change. The question now arises as to whether these 
changes can actually be ascribed to the introduction of the three-point rule. In addition to the 
rule change regarding the reward system, a couple of further rule modifications were imple-
mented over the last few years. For instance, the offside rule in German soccer leagues was 
changed twice and the rules for yellow and red card fouls were tightened. Those rule changes 
may also have had an influence on the nature of the soccer games. Furthermore, the strategic 
approach of the teams has changed over the years to a more defensive one. This modified 
strategy could lead to significant changes in results, which could incorrectly be claimed as an 
effect of the three-point rule. 
In order to control for these possible effects in rule and strategy modifications, this paper 
draws a comparison between German soccer league matches from 1985/86 to 2004/05 and 
those of the German cup tournament over the same period. All rule changes that took place in 
the German soccer league also applied to the cup games (except for the three-point rule). In 
addition, it can be assumed that all strategic changes in team play for league games were also 
transferred to the cup games. If it were possible to find significant differences between game 
results before and since the introduction of the three-point rule in league games, compared to 
                                                 
1 Some countries adopted the new rule before the world-wide introduction, e.g. England in the season 1981/82 or 




the “control group” of cup games, these changes could be attributed directly to the three-point 
rule. 
 
The next section describes some previous research on the effects of the three-point rule. Then, 
the theoretical implications of the new rule (Section 3) and the data used (Section 4) are ex-
plained. Section 5 briefly outlines the results obtained from data only for the German soccer 
league. Section 6 describes the method used to compare data from league and cup games, and 
Section 7 provides the results of these comparisons. Subsequently, Section 8 takes a closer 
look at the effect of the three-point rule on the level of aggression in the soccer game. The 
final section provides some conclusions and an outlook for further research. 
 
2. Review of Previous Studies  
Over the last few years, numerous publications have dealt with the theoretical and empirical 
effects of the three-point rule in soccer. For the most part, empirical studies using data from 
different leagues and (different) time periods often yielded differing and partly even contra-
dictory results. 
In the first study to use data from the German soccer league, Klotz and Gerhard (2000) could 
not find any differences in the number of games ending in a tie or differences in the number 
of goals per game over the last five years before, and the first five years since the rule change. 
Therefore, they drew the conclusion that the performance of soccer teams is attributable more 
to emotions than rational behaviour. In their opinion, the incentive to win is independent of 
the points that can be gained from such a win.   
By contrast, Başlevent and Tunalı (2001) found an increase in the average number of goals 
per game of nearly one goal, and a strong decrease in the number of games that ended in a tie 




Turkey soccer league from 1982/83 till 1999/2000, where the rule was introduced before the 
1987/88 season.  
In their investigation of the Portuguese premier league, Guedes and Machado (2002) studied 
the effect of the rule change in terms of the playing ability of the teams. Even though only 
weaker teams played significantly more offensively after the rule change, only stronger teams 
were able to score significantly more goals per game than before the change. Overall, the 
number of goals increased between the observed periods of 1994/95 and 1995/96. However, 
these additional goals were shot by favourite teams, while the number of scored goals shot by 
weaker teams decreased. The proportion of ties remained nearly unchanged.  
Dewenter (2003) conducted empirical tests using Portuguese league data over a longer time 
period (1934/1935 till 2001/02) and came up with two findings. On the one hand, the average 
number of goals per game and the goal difference decreased since the introduction of the new 
rule (compared to the many decades before). On the other hand, the rule seemed to have ex-
erted a negative effect on the home field advantage. Furthermore, the goal difference de-
creased as a result of the rule change. Dewenter (2003) therefore drew the conclusion that a 
decline in scored goals seems to make the games less attractive, whereas at the same time, the 
decrease in home field advantage leads to exciting and less predictable games.  
Amann, Dewenter and Namini (2004) provided further indications of a decrease in the home 
field advantage by means of data from the German soccer league from 1963/64 to 2000/01. 
The number of goals (goals of the home teams as well as of the away teams) and the number 
of victories decreased during the time period under examination. While the percentage of 
home team victories fell significantly, the percentage of away team victories increased sig-
nificantly. Furthermore, the total number of goals and home team goals declined significantly, 
while the number of away team goals decreased only insignificantly. 
The theoretical model of Brocas and Carrillo (2004) showed that what constitutes the optimal 




lead to more offensive play at the end of the game, whereas a tie at the beginning (and every 
match starts 0:0) could lead to more defensive play, since the teams try to avoid conceding an 
early goal. A leading team is enticed to play as defensively as possible, in order to minimize 
the risk of a goal against it, whilst the losing team will play as offensively as possible, thereby 
attempting to maximize the chances of scoring a goal. This offensive play of the team being 
led is independent of the points awarded for a win. 
Hundsdoerfer (2004) first considered undetermined effects on the tactic of the teams in theo-
retical terms. He then shows empirically, that both the average number of goals and the aver-
age number of offensive moves in the examined period (1980/81 to 2001/02) in the German 
soccer league decreased, whereas the average number of minutes without a goal in a game 
increased. Comparing seven seasons before and since the introduction of the new rule, it is 
evident that the number of games ending in a tie and especially goalless games, decreased 
considerably. By contrast, a comparison over a longer time period before the rule change 
shows an increase in the number of ties. Therefore, Hundsdoerfer drew the conclusion that the 
data are not suited for showing the effects of the three-point rule. 
Shepotylo (2006) examined another aspect of the rule change by means of data from the So-
viet and Ukrainian league over the period 1980/81 till 2002/03, and in addition, the Italian 
Serie A (1993/94 till 2002/03). The increase in points for a win could lead implicitly or ex-
plicitly to collusion, since the reward for one victory and one defeat is higher than the reward 
for two draws. There is a high incentive for collusion in games between teams that are almost 
equally strong (since the possibility of a draw is very high) and do not compete for the upper 
ranking positions in the championship. An examination of the Ukrainian league, (however in 
comparison with the Soviet league before the rule change) showed a substantial decrease in 
the number of draws, whereas the percentage of home team wins increased. Shepotylo there-
fore concluded that the introduction of the three-point rule had a positive effect on leagues 




other hand, in countries with substantial corruption and a minimally competitive environment, 
the incentive for collusion rose significantly through the new rule, especially for weaker 
teams not competing in the championship. 
Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2006) compared data from the 1994/95 season in the first 
Spanish soccer league with that from the 1998/99 season and controlled their results with data 
from the Spanish cup tournament.
2 They investigated mainly the change in the number of un-
fair situations in game play, especially those leading to a yellow or red card. They argue that 
the incentive towards unfair play must have increased due to the rule change. In an examina-
tion of league games, Garicano and Palacios-Huerta showed that the number of draws and of 
games with a goal difference of two or more goals decreased significantly, while the numbers 
of shots on goal and corner kicks, of yellow cards and of games with a goal difference of one 
increased. Taking into account the cup games, it can be stated that the number of games end-
ing in a tie did not actually decrease, but the offensive manner of play as well as the number 
of fouls and yellow cards increased. Further consequences of the rule change were the provi-
sion of additional time and the fact that attendance (and interest) in the games decreased. Ga-
ricano and Palacios-Huerta attributed this to the increased level of unfair play by the teams.  
In a review study with data from seven different countries, Aylott and Aylott (2007) demon-
strated that the average number of goals per game (with the exception of the German soccer 




                                                 
2 In order to gain a larger mass of data from cup games, they included the 1993/94 and 1997/98 seasons in their 
control group of cup games in addition to the 1994/95 and 1998/99 season.  
3 In ice hockey, there was also a rule change in the 1999/2000 season, with respect to the points gained after 
overtime. Under the old rule, the winner of an overtime game received two points and the loser zero points. Un-
der the new rule, both teams receive one point after the regular game time and the potential winner gains one 
additional point after the overtime. Banerjee, Swinnen and Weersink (2006) found both theoretically and empiri-
cally that the new rule has an effect on the game play during regular time and during overtime. However, while 
in overtime, the rule change functioned as anticipated by encouraging more offensive play, the effect during the 




3. Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses 
The aim of introducing the new three-point rule by the FIFA was to make the matches more 
attractive. The number of games ending in a tie and especially the scoreless games were to be 
reduced by means of the increase in points for a win and, consequently, devaluation of draws. 
Indeed, since the introduction of the new rule there is a clear incentive for the teams to avoid a 
draw, since the former zero-sum-game now means one more point for both teams together if 
one team wins. This incentive leads to the first and most important hypothesis: 
 
(H1) The introduction of the three-point rule has led to a decrease in the number of games 
ending in a tie. 
 
Apart from this main hypothesis, four additional hypotheses are to be tested. The model of 
Brocas and Carrillo (2004) shows that the new rule, particularly at the beginning of the game, 
provides an incentive to play more defensively in order to avoid an early goal for the other 
side, which would outweigh an early lead.
4 The following hypothesis can be derived from this 
greater defensive incentive for both teams at the beginning of the match:  
 
(H2)  Games are decided at a later point during the play. 
 
Furthermore, a leading team has always had and still has a strong incentive to play defen-
sively, but this has been increased further, through the introduction of the new rule, since a 
further goal does not earn any additional points, while losing a goal costs now two points in-
                                                 
4 When being led, an (own) goal gains just one point, while a team in the lead loses two points through a goal 





5  The team that is losing at that point in time will play offensively, since it is 
already behind and has nothing to lose. Yet, ceteris paribus, this offensive incentive is weaker 
than the defensive incentive of the leading team, since the team behind gains just one more 
point by a goal
6, whilst the leading team would lose two points. Additionally, in comparison 
to the old rule, one point now is less valuable, as it comprises only one third of the possible 
points for a win and no longer one half. Finally, it is difficult to succeed with an offensive 
manner of play against a defensive playing team. Therefore, it could be beneficial to conserve 
the players’ strength (and the number of yellow and red cards) for upcoming matches. The 
greater defensive incentive of the leading team (along with Hypothesis 1 or the higher offen-
sive incentive of a tied score) leads to another hypothesis: 
 
(H3) The goal difference in wins under the new rule is smaller than under the old rule.  
 
Another hypothesis can be derived directly from this one. Accordingly, Hypothesis 4 relates 
to more closely contested games and to the results of Dewenter (2003) and Amann, Dewenter 
and Namini (2004):  
 
(H4) The total amount of goals scored under the three-point rule is lower than under the old 
rule. 
 
As mentioned above, the incentive to win with a large goal difference is essentially lower than 
the incentive to secure a narrow victory by playing defensively. However, this only holds ce-
                                                 
5 Only the goal difference between leading and being led team enhances what is normally of subordinate impor-
tance. Additionally, more goals of course ensure a win against the opposing team, but if a team attack was the 
best form of defence, a defensive strategy would make no sense or be identical in effect to the offensive strategy. 
6 The team, however, also wins the option for two more points while under the old rule, only one more point 
through another goal was possible. Additionally, the opponent team loses two points through the equalisation, 




teris paribus. Especially at the end of a season, the number of goals could play a decisive role 
with respect to the final rankings. 
 
A final hypothesis is therefore intended to confirm or refute the results of Dewenter (2003) 
and Amann, Dewenter and Namini (2004): 
 
(H5) The home field advantage decreases under the new rule. 
 




In order to examine of the consequences of the three-point rule, in each case, data from ten 
seasons of the German soccer league, before and after the rule change, are analysed and com-
pared to games of the German cup tournament (DFB-Pokal) for the same seasons. 18 teams 
participate in the German soccer league and play against each other twice a season (first and 
second round). Therefore, each season has a total of 306 games, with the exception of the 
1991/92 season after the German reunification, when 20 teams participated (380 games). 
In the cup tournament, the mode of play changed repeatedly over the period 1985/86 until 
1993/94, so that the number of games in each season was not constant over the course of this 
period (it fluctuated between 66 and 87), but, since the 1994/95 season, 63 games have always 
taken place. There were differences in the mode of play, not only in the number of rounds 
played before the eighth final
7, but also in the implementation of a qualification round before 
the first main round in a couple of seasons and the time in the tournament when the first 
                                                 
7 In three seasons of the evaluation period, a third round was played additionally to the two main rounds before 




league teams took part in the competition. Besides the 1991/92 till 1993/94 seasons
8, 64 teams 
competed in the first out of two main rounds of every cup tournament. Since the 2001/02 sea-
son, all teams from the first division have to play the first main round. Over the entire evalua-
tion period of the cup tournament, the winner of a game proceeded to the next round, whereas 
the loser had to leave the tournament altogether. The fixtures are drawn by lot before every 
round. Teams that do not play in the first or second division always have a right to play at 
home in games against teams from the first or second division. For the entire evaluation pe-
riod, the cup final took place at the Olympic-Stadium in Berlin. 
Especially for teams which do not play in the first division, the cup-tournament always repre-
sents one of the highlights of the season. Games against teams from the first division guaran-
tee excellent attendance, as well as revenue from both spectators and sponsors. If the games 
are broadcast live on TV, the teams earn additional revenues from royalties. 
In addition to the final and half-time scores, the goals (for home and away teams) and the time 
of scoring are analysed. Furthermore, the number of yellow and red cards, as well as (after 
their introduction in 1991) the number of second yellow cards, day and time of the game, 
number of viewers, and number and time of player exchanges, are surveyed. Overall, in the 
German soccer league, 6,194 games were analysed over an evaluation period from 1985/86 to 
2004/05, as well as 1,353 games in the cup tournament during the same period.  
 
5. Empirical Results from First League German Soccer 
In this section, the empirical results are presented for the five hypotheses, using only data 
from the first league. The analysis differentiates between individual games (3,134 matches 
under the two-point rule, and 3,060 matches under the three-point rule) and an analysis with 
aggregated data at the level of teams per season (182 data points under the two-point rule and 
180 data points under the three-point rule). 
                                                 





(H1) The introduction of the three-point rule has led to a decrease in the number of games 
ending in a tie. 
An examination of data from the German soccer league shows that the number of games end-
ing in a tie decreased significantly (at the 1 % level) from 29.23 % to 25.75 % of all games. 
An analysis of the number of draws for each team in one season
9 shows an average of 4.95 
drawn games under the two-point rule and a decrease to 4.38 games under the new rule. Re-
placing the dummy variable (0 = seasons under two-point rule, 1 = seasons under three-point 
rule) by two time-trend dummies,
10 shows an insignificant rise in the number of draws over 
the ten years before the rule change and a highly significant (at the 1‰ level) decrease after 
the rule change. Figure 1 shows the average number of draws for a home team per season. 
 
                                                 
9 In order to avoid overlapping, only home team games are analysed. Each team plays 17 games per season at 
home (19 games in the 1991/92 season, the average numbers are adjusted accordingly) and since 18 teams play 
in the league (20 in season 1991/92), there are 306 games per season (380 games in the 1991/92 season). 
10 Variable TimeTrend1 takes the value 0 for all seasons since the introduction of the rule, -1 for the last season 
before the rule change, -2 for the last but one season and so on. Variable TimeTrend2 is 0 for all seasons under 































































































































































































































Especially the number of scoreless games decreased from 8.17 % to 6.93 % (significant at the 
10 % level). An examination based on all scoreless games per team and season shows that the 
goalless games decreased from 1.39 to 1.18 games per team and season, which is significant 
at the same level. The results of this initial examination suggest that the main objective of the 
FIFA was achieved, because the introduction of the three-point rule caused a significant de-
crease in the number of draws and scoreless games. 
 
(H2) Games are decided at a later point during the play. 
In order to test this hypothesis, the minute of the decisive goal
11 under the old and the new 
rule is compared. Under the two-point rule, the decision on the point allocation is made in the 
43.78
th minute of the game on average while the decision happens almost two minutes later 
(45.48
th minute) under the new rule. This change in the time of decision is significant at the 
5 % level. 
                                                 





Other evidence to support the hypothesis of later goals and thus games being decided later, is 
provided in Figure 2, which shows the goals per minute in draws played under both the two 
and three-point rules. The plotted regression lines demonstrate that the possibility of an early 
goal in a currently prevailing draw under the two point rule is greater than under the three-
point rule. However, after the 22
nd minute, the possibility of scoring a goal where there is a 
draw situation under the new rule is and remains higher until the end of the game, where it is 
especially high. 
 







































(H3) The goal difference for wins under the new rule is smaller than under the old rule. 
The empirical data show a significant decrease at the 1 ‰ level of the goal difference in 
games that ended in a win from 2.02 to 1.91 goals per game. The number of games won with 
a difference of only one goal is another indication of more closely contested games under the 




(significant at the 1 % level). While the average number of games with a goal difference of 
one was 4.96 per season and per home team under the old rule, now averages 5.56 games per 
team and season end, with a goal difference of one under the new rule (also significant at the 
1 % level). An examination of the two time trend variables shows only a barely observable 
decrease under the two-point rule, but a significant increase (5 % level) under the three-point 
rule as Figure 3 illustrates. 
 









































































































































































































































(H4) The total amount of goals scored under the three-point rule is lower than under the old 
rule. 
With respect to the results of the more narrowly contested games, an obvious assumption is a 
decline in the number of goals per game. As already stated, the incentive to win with a large 
goal difference is smaller than the incentive to protect a tight lead by playing more defen-




goals per game declined from 2.93 to 2.87, but this decrease is not significant. While the 
number of home-team goals decreased significantly from 1.79 to 1.70 goals per game (signifi-
cant at the 1 % level), the number of away-team goals increased insignificantly from 1.14 to 
1.17 goals per game.  
 
(H5) The home field advantage decreases under the new rule. 
Finally, the change in the number of home and away-game wins is analysed. Since the num-
ber of games that ended in a tie decreased, the number of wins consequently had to increase. 
The data analysis showed an insignificant decrease of home-team wins from 49.23 % to 
48.50 %, but a significant increase of away-game wins from 21.54 % to 25.75 % (significant 
at the 1 ‰ level). In conformity with some of the other studies presented in Section 2,
12 this 
result is evidence of a decline in home field advantage. 
 
6. The Estimation of “Difference-in-Differences” 
In order to verify whether the detected relationships really are effects of the three-point rule, 
the results of Section 5 are compared with those for the German cup tournament during the 
same period. For this purpose, a so called “Difference-in-Differences estimation” (DID) is 
used.
13 This DID-method entails an OLS-regression with three dummy-variables as independ-
ent variables.
14  
To test the hypotheses listed above, the following model is estimated: 
01 2 3 , ii i i i i zx y x y e β βββ =+ + + + 
                                                 
12 Dewenter (2003) and Amann, Dewenter and Namini (2004). 
13 Abadie (2005). 




where  i z  is the corresponding dependent variable for game i, 
1, for league games







1, for games under three-point-rule






i e  represents the residues, i.e. the deviation between the expected and the actually observed 
value.  
 
Due to the four occurring combinations of the independent variables, the following expected 
values for the dependent variable are possible: 
 
Table 1: Expected values of the dependent variable of the regression 
 League  Cup  Difference 
1985/86-1994/95  β0 + β1  β0  β1 
1995/96-2004/05  β0 + β1 + β2 + β3  β0 + β2  β1 + β3 
Difference  β2 + β3  β2  β3 
 
The regression coefficient β0 indicates the expected value of the dependent variable for cup 
games under the two-point rule, since  0 ˆi z β =  (expected value of  i z ) subject to the condition 
that all independent variables are 0. β1 computes the difference between the mean values of 
league and cup games before the introduction of the new rule, since β1 displays the change of 
ˆi z  for a change in  i x  from 0 to 1. Accordingly, β1 + β3 shows the difference between the 
mean values of the league and cup games after the introduction of the three-point rule. The 
differences in means between cup games before and since the rule-change are represented by 
β2 and the corresponding differences in league games by β2 + β3. The most interesting aspect 




the kind of game (league or cup game) and the date of game (before or since the three-point 
rule). Therefore, β3 computes the “real” effect of the three-point rule. 
 
While performing the “difference-in-differences estimation” (DID), some assumptions of this 
method must be considered. DID makes the assumption that there would not have been any 
change in the relevant data for the cup games without the introduction of the three-point 
rule.
15 This notion is, of course, an oversimplification in some cases, as some results in the 
following section demonstrate quite clearly. Since all teams competing in the cup tournament 
play at the same time under the three-point rule (since its introduction) in their respective 
leagues, the rule could influence the nature of play in the cup games by changing the training 
or the selection of team members.  
 
7. Empirical Results of the Estimation of “Difference-in-Differences” 
Before analysing the cup games and comparing the results to those of the league games, some 
peculiarities of the cup tournament should be clarified. All games in the cup tournament lead 
to the elimination of the losing team from the tournament. Therefore, each game must end in a 
win for one of the two teams. If a game ends in a tie after 90 minutes, an overtime of 30 min-
utes is played. Until the 1990/91 season, a game that ended without a winner after overtime 
had to be repeated at a later date.
16 If the replay also ended in a tie after 90 plus 30 minutes, a 
penalty shoot-out followed. Since 1991/92, any game that ends in a tie is decided by a penalty 
shoot-out.
17 
                                                 
15 For further assumptions of the method and a critical discussion, see Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004). 
16 Except for the cup-final, which was decided by a penalty shoot-out, if it ended in a tie after 120 minutes. 
17 Before the abolishment of the replay game, it was conceivable that both teams could be content with the tie, if 
the match was tied shortly before the end of the overtime, because they would have a replay game which brought 
additional revenue. A survey did not reveal a significant change in the number of games that ended in a tie after 




An additional particularity of the cup tournament is the participation of teams that do not play 
in the first soccer league. Presently, each team from the second division, and 28 teams from 
the third or lower divisions, qualify for the first round of the cup tournament.
18 By means of 
drawing the fixtures in each season, different numbers of games between a team from the first 
division and teams from lower divisions are played. Furthermore, the number of games be-
tween two teams from lower leagues before and since the rule change, have varied. This could 
create a problem in interpreting home and away-team wins, since teams from the third or 
lower divisions usually have the right to play at home against teams from the first or second 
division. 
The number of games between two teams that do not play in the first league decreased sig-
nificantly at the 5 % level under the new rule, while the number of games between two teams 
of the first league and the number of games between a first league team and a team from 
lower leagues did not change significantly before and after the introduction of the three-point 
rule. In order to interpret the results, it must be kept in mind that potential differences between 
the number of home and away-team wins, in comparison to the league games, could result 
from these changes. 
 
The results of Section 5 are now evaluated in comparison with results from the cup tourna-
ment. With respect to the total number of goals, only the first 90 minutes of the cup games are 
analysed, so as to facilitate a comparison with league games. For the analysis of  
•  the percentage of draws,  
•  scoreless games,  
•  goals in the last two minutes,  
•  the percentage of games with a goal difference of one,  
                                                 
18 For a more precise description of the qualifying-mode, see http://www.dfb.de/index.php?id=160547, last 




•  the goal difference in games that did not end in a tie and the  
•  percentage of home and away-team wins,  
also data from overtime are included, if an overtime was necessary.  
Before comparing league and cup games by the DID-method, a short overview of the results 
with only cup data is presented. In this overview, only those results are included which yield a 
significant change in relation to the analysis of the league games.
19 
Unlike the league results, the number of draws in cup games increased insignificantly from 
10.51 % to 12.38 %, while the number of scoreless games decreased insignificantly from 
3.18 % to 2.70 %. In line with the results of the league games, the games are decided at a later 
point in time. The point of decision moves from the 44.19
th minute (on average) to the 46.67
th 
minute, but this change is not significant. The percentage of games ending with a goal differ-
ence of one increased insignificantly from 35.96 % to 39.84 % and the goal difference in 
games that did not end in a tie increased insignificantly from 2.14 to 2.21 goals. Additionally, 
the total number of goals scored in a game decreased insignificantly. Whereas, under the two-
point rule, an average of 3.31 goals was scored, the average number of goals under the new 
rule was 3.22. A significant decrease occurred in the number of home-team goals achieved, 
which decreased from 1.46 to 1.25 goals per game. The number of away-team goals increased 
only insignificantly from 1.86 to 1.97. Another significant change (at the 5 % level) can be 
observed in the percentage of home-team wins which decreased from 37.90 % to 32.38 %, 
whereas the percentage of away-team wins increased insignificantly from 51.04 % to 
54.44 %. As mentioned, the percentage of away-team wins of all games is substantially higher 
in the cup tournament in contrast to the league tournament, resulting from the special charac-
teristics of the play mode in the cup tournament. In comparison to the league games, the re-
sults displayed in Table 2 and 3 emerge. 
 
                                                 




Table 2: Percentage of relevant variables of all games 
    Two-point rule  Three-point rule 
League  29.23 %  25.72 %  Percentage of draws 
  Cup  10.51 %  12.38 % 
League  8.17 %  6.93 % 
Percentage of scoreless games 
Cup  3.18 %  2.70 % 
League  12.03 %  15.00 %  Percentage of games with goals in 
the last two minutes  Cup  16.46 %  16.83 % 
League  29.20 %  32.68 %  Percentage of games with a goal 
difference of one  Cup  35.43 %  39.84 % 
League 49.23  %  48.5 % 
Percentage of home-team wins 
Cup  37.90 %  32.38 % 
League  21.54 %  25.75 % 
Percentage of away-team wins 
Cup  51.04 %  54.44 % 
 
Table 3: Mean and standard deviation of examined variables 
   Two-point rule  Three-point rule 
   mean  standard dev.  mean  standard dev. 
League 0.12  0.340  0.16  0.380  Number of goals shot in the 
last two regular minutes  Cup 0.17 0.390  0.17  0.391 
League 2.02  1.154  1.91 1.038  Goal difference in games that 
ended with a winner  Cup 2.14 1.557  2.21  1.581 
League 1.79  1.416  1.70  1.339 
Home-team goals 
Cup 1.46 1.466  1.25  1.231 
League 1.14  1.125  1.17  1.135 
Away-team goals 
Cup 1.86 1.706  1.97  1.860 
League 2.93  1.767  2.87 1.711 
Total goals 





The analysis of the cup results shows that a comparison of the percentage of home-team wins, 
as well as home-team goals in cup and league tournament cannot be estimated with the DID-
method, since the assumption of no change in the cup data is not fulfilled. The other results 
permit an application of the DID-method, since they fulfil the assumption of no change before 
and since the introduction of the three-point rule. 
The following comparison of league and cup games differentiates between analyses at the 
levels of absolute figures and of percentages. While the examination of the number of goals, 
as well as the goal difference in games that ended with a winner, are presented in absolute 
figures, the number of draws, scoreless games, games with a goal difference of one and home 
and away-team wins are presented in percentages. This examination with percentages is nec-
essary, since the number of games in a cup season is much lower than the number of league 
games and additionally changes from time to time (between 63 and 87 games per season). In 
the following section, the hypotheses from Section 5 are tested: 
 
(H1) The introduction of the three-point rule has led to a decrease in the number of games 
ending in a tie. 
By comparing the percentage of draws per season in league and cup tournaments before and 
since the introduction of the three-point rule, the DID-method shows a significant decrease in 
































































































































































































































In this analysis, a slight increase in the percentage of draws in cup games since the 1995/96 
season is noticeable. This is contrary to the conceivable assumption that teams adapt their 
strategy and game-play from league to cup game. Based on the fact that the increase in the 
percentage of draws in cup games is the normal trend without a rule change in the reward sys-
tem, the decrease in the percentage of draws in league games under the new rule is even 
stronger. The decrease of 3.51 percentage points is actually a decrease of 5 percentage points, 
compared to the trend in cup games.  
Unlike this significant change, the number of scoreless games decreased only insignificantly 
in comparison to the scoreless games in the cup tournament. 
 
(H2) Games are decided at a later point during the play. 
Compared to the results of the cup games, the shift in the decisive play caused by the three-
point rule is no longer significant. This shift is even greater in cup games than in league 





(H3) The goal difference in wins under the new rule is smaller than under the old rule.  
The decrease in the goal difference in decided games is confirmed by the cup games. The de-
crease caused by the three-point rule is significant at the 10 % level and, with 0.181 goals per 
decided game, even greater than the actual decrease in league games. This is due to the fact 
that the goal difference in cup games increased, while the goal difference in league games 
decreased. The percentage of games with a goal difference of one also increased significantly 
at the same level, in comparison to the cup data and amounts to an increase of 7.4 percentage 
points. 
 
(H4) The total amount of goals scored under the three-point rule is lower than under the old 
rule. 
In line with the results of the league data, the inclusion of the cup data reveals no significant 
influence of the three-point rule on the total number of goals scored, which increased insig-
nificantly by about 0.03 goals per game. Since the analysis of cup games showed a significant 
decrease in the number of home-team goals, a comparison with league games is not possible, 
as the assumptions of the DID-method are not fulfilled. The increase in away-team goals in 
cup games is higher than in league games (0.11 goals per games, compared to 0.02 goals). 
Therefore, the increase caused by the three-point rule is not significant. However, the reason 
with respect to the cup games seems to be different, namely the higher share of first-league 
teams visiting teams of lower leagues. 
 
(H5) The home-field advantage decreases under the new rule. 
A comparison of league and cup home-team wins by means of the DID-method is not possi-
ble, since the assumption of no change in cup games is not fulfilled. The number of away-




is, of course, not significant. In this respect, the question arises again of whether a comparison 
of the percentage of home and away-team wins between league and cup games makes sense, 
because in cup games, underdogs mostly play at home against favourites. Therefore, a possi-
ble home-team advantage has to be evaluated in a different manner to a home-team advantage 
in league games. 
In Table 4, all results of the comparison of league and cup games using the DID-method are 
summarised.  
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N  40  40 7547  7547 40  40 
R²  0.830 0.655 0.001 0.007 0.370 0.950 
“Tournament” is described by the dummy-variable x, that is, the difference between league and cup tournament. 
“Rule” stands for the dummy-variable y, the variable which measures the difference between cup games under 
the two and the three-point rule. Finally, “Effect” describes the net-effect of the three-point rule. 
*Significant at the 10 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, *** significant at the 1 % level. 




8. Does the New Rule Make Matches More Unfair? 
From their analysis of the three-point rule, Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2006) draw the 
conclusion that the new rule makes the game more aggressive, as the number of warnings in 
the form of (yellow and red) cards increased significantly. In our examination, an analysis 
only with data from league games seems to make no sense, as there was some tightening-up 
of the rules for yellow and red cards over the last twenty years, which could also have con-
tributed to an increase in the number of yellow and red cards. The inclusion of cup data now 
allows an examination of the three-point rule effect on the number of yellow and red cards.
20  
Therefore, the number of yellow and red cards in games with overtime is multiplied by ¾ to 
facilitate a comparison with the number of cards in league games.
21 Since all the rule changes 
took place in league and cup tournament (except for the introduction of the three-point rule), 
an examination of the yellow and red cards is now possible and worth conducting. Therefore, 
a sixth hypothesis can be introduced: 
 
(H6) Under the three-point rule, the number of yellow and red cards has increased. 
A comparison of the change in the number of yellow cards by means of the DID-method is 
not possible, since the number of yellow cards, subdivided into yellow cards for the home and 
away teams, changed significantly in both the league and the cup games over the course of 
time, due to the abovementioned rule-tightening over the last twenty years. Therefore, an 
analysis with the help of time-trend variables should now show the effect of the three-point 
rule on the number of yellow cards. In line with the time-trend examination of Section 5, two 
time-trend variables describe the change in the number of yellow cards of home teams in the 
course of seasons. The analysis shows that all changes are significant at the 1 ‰ level, except 
                                                 
20 A possible change in the number of second yellow cards is not examined, since the second yellow card was 
introduced only after 1991. 
21 This calculation of the number of yellow and red cards for games over 90 minutes is necessary, since the exact 




for the Variable TimeTrend2 in league games, which is significant at the 5 % level. In this 
context, the trend lines are of interest (see Figure 5). While under the old rule, the number of 
cards increased due to the rule tightening almost parallel in league and cup matches, under the 
new rule, the number of cards declined considerably in cup games, while it stagnated at a high 
level in league games. A possible interpretation of these different developments in league and 
cup games could be that the teams react to the rule tightening and avoid situations that lead to 
warnings in cup games. In league games however, the introduction of the three-point rule 
leads to more aggressive play, despite the risk of a warning. 
Almost traditionally, the average number of yellow cards for away teams is higher than that of 
teams which play at home. Apart from that, the analysis of the number of yellow cards for the 
away teams yields similar results. The total of cards increased under the old rule in league and 
cup games, while it declined in cup games, and stagnated in league games under the new rule, 
as Figure 6 depicts. However, in contrast to the yellow cards of home teams, the Variable 
TimeTrend2 is not significant for cup and league games. 
For an analysis of the number of red cards, divided into cards for the home and the away 
team, the DID-estimation is again a possible method, as the change in the number of red cards 
in cup games before and since the rule change is not significant. However, the number of red 
cards in league games shows no significant increase, compared to that of cup games. This 
could be due to the low number of red cards per game. On average, only 0.10 red cards under 
the old rule and only 0.11 red cards under the new rule were found in league games. In cup 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9. Conclusions and Outlook 
The comparison of the league results with data from the German cup tournament shows that 
the influence of the three-point rule on game play in the German soccer league is not as strong 
as could be expected from the results of an analysis based on league data only. The main ar-
gument in favour of the rule change was the decrease in games ending in a tie. This aim was 
achieved, as the comparison with the relevant cup data shows. The percentage of games that 
ended in a tie decreased significantly, even when compared with cup data. The effect of the 
three-point rule on the goal difference is a counterproductive result of the comparison. The 
introduction of the rule affects this aspect, as the comparison with cup games confirms. While 
the goal difference in decided games decreased, the percentage of games that ended with a 
goal difference of one increased. This can be explained by the fact that teams are not inter-
ested in a win with many (useless) goals. If they are the leading team, they will play very de-
fensively and attempt to defend the lead, instead of playing offensively and trying to score 
more goals. Another ambivalent fact is the increase in the number of yellow cards, which is 
also significant in comparison with the cup data. The introduction of the new rule seems to 
cause more aggressive play. The other significant changes that occurred in league data before 
and since the three-point rule could not be attributed directly to the three-point rule. The fact 
that the three-point rule could have an influence on game play in the cup tournament cannot 
be excluded in this context. Since all teams that play in the cup tournament stick to the three-
point rule in their league games, it is possible that they transfer their playing strategy from 
league to cup games. The significant results with respect to the percentage of draws or the 
number of yellow cards, for example, contradict this aspect. 
The fact that teams from lower divisions participate in cup games is problematic for the inter-
pretation of results. Although this concern is somewhat allayed, because they played in the 
cup tournament before and after the introduction of the new rule, the significant difference in 




that this aspect has to be considered. A restriction of cup games to only those in which first 
league teams participate, would be too limiting, since there were only 220 games between 
first league teams in the evaluation period (between 4 and 18 games per season). 
Therefore, an interesting starting point for further investigation would be a weighting of the 
games according to the division to which the participating teams belong. For example, a goal 
scored by a first league team against a team from the fourth division could be weighted less 
than a goal shot against a first league team, but the exact weighting seems less clear. 
A further interesting aspect could be the examination of fouls that were not punished by issu-
ing a yellow or red card, but rather by a free kick for the opposing team. If the introduction of 
the three-point rule really has an influence on aggressiveness in play, the number of fouls in 
league games should increase to a greater extent than those in cup games. 
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